The central aims of this book are (1) to present an overview of the philosophical debate on trust in the last three decades; (2) to address a central issue in that debate, namely, the presumed prima facie conflict between trust and rationality; and (3) in the course of the analysis, to apply a non-essentialist understanding of psychological concepts, as developed in Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology. The task is not to judge between different definitions of trust. Instead we need awareness of what is implied in a given case when behaviour is singled out as an instance of trust. To invoke the vocabulary of trust and distrust in human interaction is both to describe it, to take a certain perspective on it and to influence it. This is also true in the philosophical debate itself. The issue of trust has been taken up in response to various theoretical conundrums. A dominant theme is the need to refute scepticism and show why trust can be embraced as a rationally justified pursuit. The author argues that this approach must in the end be self-refuting because it would lose the phenomenon it wants to justify. What emerges is instead a conception of rationality that includes the entire web of practices and ways of thinking that constitute human agency, including our ways of speaking about them. We are always already embedded in relations of dependence, we are ethically committed to each other as beings that trust and receive trust.

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