Nt~LS ERIK R0SEN;E'E DT ID-K... ~, , .o, w·r ,;~~ LiEP GE ANffi,•1! D' ffi.1', ~1~'·' ;l;I '·p·QWE ' Niels Erik Rosenfeldt Knowledge and Power of The Role Stalin's Secret Chancellery of in the Soviet System Government ROSENKILDE AND BAGGER Copenhagen 1978 Editorial Board: Bjarne Norretranders, professor, dr. phil. Hans Chr. Sorensen, professor, dr. phil. Carl Stief, professor, dr. phil. Knud Rasmussen, universitetslektor, dr. phil. Studier 1. Knud Rasmussen: Die livlandische Krise 1554-1561. 1973. Studier 2. Ole Vesterholt: Tradition and Individuality. A Study in Slavonic Oral Epic Poetry. 1973. Studier 3. William Thorndal: Studier over genitivens og loka tivens -y/ -JO-endelser i russiske middelaldertekster. 1974. Studier 4. Hans Bagger: Ruslands alliancepolitik efter freden i Ny stad. En studie i det slesvigske Restitutionssp0rgsmal. 1974. Studier 5. Niels Erik Rosenfeldt: Knowledge and Power. The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government. 1978. Materialer I. Pis'ma A. M. Remizova i B. Ja. Brjusova k 0. Ma delungu. Publikacija P. Al'berga Jensena i P. U. Mellera. 1976. Materialer 2. Knud Rasmussen og Niels Erik Rosenfeldt: lntro duktion til studiet af Ruslands og Sovjetunionens historie og samfundsforhold. (Forthcoming). © Niels Erik Rosenfeldt 1978 Printed in Denmark by Andelsbogtrykkeriet i Odense This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act 1956, no part of this publication may be repro duced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or other wise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be adressed to the publishers. ISBN 87-423-0298-6 Contents PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 INTRODUCTION 9 THE EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Testimonies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 STALIN'S PERSONAL SECRETARIAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Emigrant themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Superiority in information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Relationship with other institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The emigrant accounts: Independent or interdependent? . . . . . . . . 38 Soviet evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Final evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 THE SECRET DEPARTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Emigrant themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Service function, secret case-treatment, cadre control . . . . . . . . . . 51 Soviet evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Final evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 THE SPECIAL SECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Emigrant themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Information control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Cadre control and security functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Structure and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Relationship with other institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 The emigrant accounts: Independent or interdepend~nt? . . . . . . . . 70 Evidence 01_1 other "special departments" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Soviet evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Final evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 THE CORRELATION . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 THE MEN .............................................. 129 THE DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 The early beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 The organizational struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 The ideological struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 The consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 The culmination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 The succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 CONCLUSION 203 BIBLIOGRAPHY 208 INDEX OF NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 215 Preface The aim of this study is to register, systematize, compare and evaluate the evidence available to researchers trying to elucidate the secret chan cellery of the Soviet Communist Party in the Stalin era; and the author's attempts to realize this aim have, above all, been marked by the extreme ly fragmentary character of the source material. This fact tended to make the investigation something of a paper chase and, in addition, gave rise to a great many problems af interpretation. Many people have assisted me in surmounting both these hurdles. I am deeply indepted to those of my colleagues at the Slavonic Institute in Copenhagen who have helped me in tracking down scattered evidence and bringing important sources to my notice. And I owe special thanks to professor Bjarne N0rretran ders, associate professor Knud Rasmussen, cand. mag. Hans Bagger, mag. art. Svend Aage Christensen (all at the Slavonic Institute) and associate professor Bent Jensen (Institute of Contemporary History), who have read and commented on my manuscript. I am grateful, too, that the Slavonic Institute accepted my work as number 5 in its series of Slavonic studies. I also wish to thank the Danish Research Council for the grant which made the translation and publishing of this work economically feasible. The University of Copenhagen enabled me to pay short but profitable visits to the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., and the British Library in London. Both these libraries, and the Royal Library in Copenhagen as well, have rendered me invaluable practical assistance. Finally, I am most grateful to mr. Hamish Buchanan Barclay, M.B.E., who has translated the manuscript from Danish, for his readiness to familiarize himself with the subject and his ability to express the author's intentions. Copenhagen, April 1978 Niels Erik Rosenfeldt. THE SYSTEM Presumptive Picture of the Secret Party Chancellery in the Late Twenties POLITBUREAU ORGBUREAU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PARTY SECRETARIAT SECRET Head - Secret departm. DEPARTMENT Bureau of the ,-----7 Sectors for Secretariat various : Secret fields of Other Party Party and Secretaries' J depart- I ments in State admi- pomoscniki : State nistration 1 admini- -S-ec-re-tar-ia t -Se-c-re-t - 1 stration of the : ,- - _J ...>-:'I-IILL-------' Orgbureau archives I 1_ - J OGPU Special department ,I - ---fil-l--------7 I OGPU Security forces I ,--1----§-t- ----- __ , SPECIAL SECTOR I Special sectors in local : 1 Party administration I L--- ______ _!._ ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS (Upravlenie delami) Party finances - supply - general chancellery - etc. OTHER DEPARTMENTS IN THE CENTRAL PARTY APPARATUS Introduction The attempts of historians to describe Stalin's methods of government have left many questions unanswered. Many tentative interpretations have been advanced, and much information has been accompanied by cautious reservations about the credibility of the sources used. This problem could be "solved" by rejecting on principle the greater part of such material as lacks evidential weight, but such a solution must, for many reasons, be ruled out of court. In part the uncertain evidence very often deals with questions of central importance to the understanding of the character of the Soviet system under Stalin, and in part these pieces of evidence are, after all, so many and so strong that in one respect they hardly admit of doubt: An analysis in which the "problematical" material was, as a matter of principle, denied consider ation would, in spite of greater ostensible solidity, have debarred itself in advance from the possibility of drawing a representative picture of the innermost structure of the Stalin regime. Research into modern Soviet history has been compared with the work of medievialists. The sources - such as exist or are accessible - are frag mentary, and cannot immediately be augmented by renewed scrutiny of the archives. We do, however, write medieval history. We try by every means to create a pattern out of the fragments. We take up this challenge because essential questions force themselves forward and demand answers. And we accept, at the same time, the basic condition that scientific norms can be maintained only by constantly pointing out the strong and weak sides of the source material, by a constant caution in terminology and by a constant discrimination between well-founded hypothesis and unshakeable verified facts. In these circumstances further progress will consist chiefly in creating new theories and new combinations which partly cause already known facts to appear in another light, and partly direct attention to hitherto unnoticed or unused information. It will often be clear that the road leads into country which can never be mapped in its entirety. However, it has equally often appeared that not insignificant areas can be opened to research if only a few beacons are set up. 9 Historians whose subject is Soviet society have time and again been faced with tracks which seem to lead into totally impenetrable territory. It has been necessary to choose either to turn away, or to risk driving themselves and others onto roads with blind endings. An example to this dilemma is to be seen in the attitude of research to the various pieces of evidence available for the illumination of the very nerve-centre of the Stalin regime, the place where the threads were gathered together and decisions taken; the place through which information was channelled and intentions implemented. On one side it can be observed that such a highly estimated historian as Robert Tucker thinks it possible to indicate a power apparatus which in virtue of its all-dominating importance can be described simply as "the Stalin autocracy considered as an institu tion".1) On the other side, however, there is also the fact that equally eminent authors either do not at all, or only quite shortly, make mention of that apparatus. Even when mentioned, the description of its function is often extremely sketchy, and is in several cases founded upon no more than a single one of the available sources.2) It is, moreover, symp tomatic of historians' attitude to the material that jean-Jaques Marie, for example, feels the need to assert that the sources employed must be used "avec la plus grande prudence."3) This we shall do, fully admitting that such a warning is justified. However, Marie's reservation also contains a challenge. It is unsatis factory first to give information, then to raise a general doubt as to its validity and finally simply to allow the subject to remain in the air without further attempt at interpretation. The general scepticism ought not to be erected into a preliminary barrier. On the other hand, neither should it be disregarded in favour of a blank acceptance of all assertions in the available evidence. The fact that scholars have used the existing material in widely differing ways and to widely differing extents, together with the fact that they have not always been willing to speak in defence of what they have used, seems rather to demand a more syste matic approach, a comparative effort, an attempt to place the individual 1) Tucker, Robert: The Soviet Political Mind. Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change, rev.ed., London 1972, p. 182. 2) See e.g. Grottian, W.: Das sowjetische Rcgierungssystem I-II, zweite Auflage, Kiiln 1965 (no mention), and Fainsod, Merle: How Russia is Ruled, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1970, pp. 194, 200 (short mention). Compare also Nemzer, Louis: "The Krem lin's Professional Staff. The 'Apparatus' of the Central Commitee", American Political Science Review XLIV, no. 1, March 1950, pp. 64-85 (no mention). 3) Marie, Jean-Jacques: Staline, Paris 1967, p. 281. THE MEN Central figures in the secret chancellery 1: I. P. Tovstucha and L. Z. Mechlis.